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LAW, REASON AND SOCIOLOGY
CLAMENCE 1oRIS t
The role of rationality in the legal process, as described in the sociological
jurisprudence of Max Weber, is examined and analyzed in this Article. Pro-
fessor Morris, an established authority in the fields of tort and insurance,
here offers a comparison of Weber's system with divergent contemporary legal
thought on the nature of the judicial process, and calls for an articulate basis
for discriminating between instances in which legislatures should act to correct
unjust rules, and those in which it is appropriate for courts to act.
Socially-oriented political philosophers of the eighteenth and
nineteenth century knew little behavioral science.' Their acquaintance
with differing cultures came from their own informal observations and
from a "cosmography" of travel books and gossip. Modern anthro-
pology and sociology furnish a richer factual grounding for Twentieth
Century Sociological Jurisprudence. Max Weber, a sociologist with
legal training, took advantage of this modem opportunity. He is a
scientific describer of the patterns that law takes in societies. His
science combines both learned appreciation of many cultures and skilled
understanding of legal processes.
2
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. LL.B., 1925, University of
Colorado; LL.M., 1926, Columbia University.
1. Montesquieu, the eighteenth century environmentalist, stressed the effects on
law and government of climate, natural resources, geography, history, customs,
morality, etc. See MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS (1748). The thesis of the nine-
teenth century historical school was that each nation's unique experiences forge a
folk-spirit adapting its usages to its needs; these usages are its only reliable source
of proper laws. See SAVIGNY, VocATIoN OF OuR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND JURs-
PRUDENCE (1814).
2. When Weber is referred to in this Article citation will be made to WEBER,
LAW IN ECONOMY AND Soc=rY (1954) which will hereinafter be called LAW IN
SocwrY. The work is a translation from WIRTSCHAFT AND GEsELLscHAFT (2d ed.
1925). The translated volume was edited and annotated by Max Rheinstein, who, with
Edward Shils, did the translating.
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This Article tries to do three things. (1) State the outlines of
Weber's theories on the logic and illogicalities of law in action. (2)
Compare Weber's views with those of some important jurists at odds
with him. (3) Develop answers for some questions that are raised
by the comparisons.
WEBER'S THEORIES ON THE LAW'S RATIONALITY
Throughout the ages most legal philosophers have characterized
law as applications of formulated rules to established facts yielding deci-
sions (or logical steps towards them). Of course, no one says that
legal systems furnish wise rules, clearly applicable to any and all legal
problems. But most jurists have assumed: (1) that rules of law ascribe
a class of legal consequents to a kind of cases, and that (2) a magistrate
deciding a case attaches to facts legal consequents appropriate (in the
magistrate's eyes) to that kind of case. When, if ever, this stereotype
is what goes on, law is rational at least in the sense that it is a process
in which a resolution is kept. This kind of rationality of the judicial
process is assumed in most jurists' definitions of the law.
Weber, however, says law's actual beginnings were irrational. He
rejects the Nineteenth Century "Historical" School's thesis that early
societies developed legal principles by verbalizing their customs and
enacting them into law. Only in advanced societies, says Weber, do
legislators turn usage into statute; in primitive society new law changes
usage.3 The view, then, that early law emerged from folk spirit is
unscientific; primitive usages were rigid and tended to check, rather
than inspire, promulgations of law that nevertheless were uttered. 4
In all societies suspicions of impropriety, frictions, disputes arise; so
when men live in groups legalistic problems are inevitable. Weber defines
a law as a rule of conduct backed by a "coercive apparatus" (persons
holding themselves ready to enforce it by legal coercion) .? Such an
apparatus, even in primitive societies, at times considers whether it
should go into action. Primitives, according to Weber, resolve such
doubts by magic. Occult rites reveal that a tribesman has acted either
legally or illegally; no one, however, purports either to apply a formu-
lated legal rule to the case or to identify the salient aspects of its facts.
3. LAw iN SocIEry 34.
4. Id. at 67-68.
5. Id. at 13. Weber goes on to say that the apparatus' power must be such that
rules will probably be respected because of its availability. Id. at 14. Nevertheless,
most law abiders are more likely to conform either (1) because of their unreflecting
habituation to law (which is therefore also "usage") or (2) for fear of evoking
adverse public opinion, which is the force behind "conventions.' Id. at 12.
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Magical procedures can go forward without clearly formulated rules of
conduct-new or old.6
When, says Weber, aboriginal law does congeal into rules, primi-
tives cannot conceive that they invented or can amend these rules; they
believe that law is god-given and immutable.7 Only wizards and priests
(who commune with spirits) can interpret these supernatural edicts.'
Therefore when law is to be applied to a case, reason cannot plumb
either the meaning of the applicable rules or the significance of
operative facts.
Whenever magic is used in a legal process, its irrationality is of the
clearest sort. Weber classifies oracular law as "formally irrational." '
The historical line of change from (a) legal judgments revealed
by magic to (b) secular enactment of rules of law, says Weber, usually
happened in some such way as this: An alliance brought heads of kin-
ship groups or local chieftains into council. Their accredited magician
reported a divine principle newly revealed to him. The gathered elders
disseminated the new doctrine to their local groups and ordered them
to respect it.
"However the boundaries between technical decree, inter-
pretation of tradition by individual decision, and revelation of new
rules were vague and the magicians' prestige was unstable. Hence
the creation of law could be . . . increasingly secularized and
revelation could be either completely excluded or applied as an
ex post facto legalization of the compacts. As a result, wide areas
in which law making was once possible only through revelation
became subject to regulation by the simple consensus of the
assembled authorities." "D
In two other ways magic fell into disuse: (1) Successful military leaders
allotted prisoners, booty and conquered territory. "They thus created
new individual rights and, under certain circumstances, new law."
Preparation for and prosecution of war were furthered by promulgation
of practical legal rules. 1  (2) "In early medieval Europe . . . the
Christian Church, by its example of episcopal power, everywhere
6. Id. at 73.
7. Id. at 76. Cf. Cicero's theory that men know law because they share the right
reason of the gods. I LAWs ch. VII, at 321-22 (Keyes transl. 1952). And cf. Rousseau's
statement that in primitive times wise men could not make themselves understood and
obeyed by the common run and therefore credited God with their own wisdom and
purported to find a divinely authored law of nature. II THE SOcIAl. CONxACr ch.
VII, at 40-41 (Cole transl. 1950).
8. LAW ix SocIEry 86.
9. Id. at 63.
10. Id. at 83-84.
11. Id. at 91-92.
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strongly encouraged the interference of the princes in the administration
and enactment of the law. Indeed the Church often instigated this
intervention for its own interests as well as the interests of the ethics
it taught." '
Purging law of magic eliminates only one variety of irrationality.
In several other ways legal processes can include unreasoned steps.
Weber points out that law is forever changing without judges or
legislatures noticing the shift. The meaning of a legal term grows,
shrinks or slips imperceptively; a court decides a novel case thinking it
an example of an old well-understood type; a judge applies new law
assuming it has always obtained.' 3 But law does not have a rational
beginning when it emerges with no legislator or judge adverting to its
merits.
Many legal philosophers have said that judges' bias against and
sympathy for disputants tend to warp their reason. Aquinas, for ex-
ample (comparing legislative with judicial lawmaking), said that a
general rule enacted before occasion for its application arises is more
likely to be rational than a rule invented by a judge to dispose of a
case before him. One of three reasons he gave for his belief was that
law decided before the event is not skewed by the emotional appeal of
irrelevant aspects of concrete cases. 4 Rousseau was of the same mind
on the ground that only by consulting their "general will" on abstract
problems of policy can men design true justice; concrete cases inevitably
activate the perverse "particular will" except when they are decided by
applying principles previously formulated by exercise of the general
will." Weber also believes that prior rule formulation is crucial for
rationality. He observes that jural thought of the western world
tends to favor separation of governmental powers by allocating the "law-
maker" role to one branch of the government and the "law finder and
applier" role to another. He classifies legal systems in which these
functions are not separated as "irrational." He says the separation is
not made when there is "free" adjudication from case to case, and
therefore irrational law (in a pure or modified form) has been man's
12. Id. at 92. Not only was adjudicative law magical in primitive times; the ways
of entering into some binding legal relations were also magical. Weber says the
invention of money tended to eliminate magic and sacramental elements from legal
transactions. Id. at 109.
13. Id. at 67.
14. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLoGICA, 1st pt. of 2d pt., QQ.95, art. 1, reply objec-
tion 2. The other two reasons are: (1) It is easier to find a few wise legislators than
many wise judges; and (2) Legislators have more time to study the whole nature of
a problem than judges who must act promptly on a single set of facts.
15. See THE SocU. CONTRACt, especially Book II, chs. III, IV, at 26-32 (Cole
transl. 1950). Rousseau, by the way, probably never read Thomas; the Sumnma was not
translated into French until after Rousseau's death and Rousseau was poor at Latin.
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fate through world history except in Rome and in countries that adopted
the Roman system.'
Remember Weber has used the term "formal irrationality" 17 to
denote oracular systems of law. Magical methods are not inconsistent
with separation of powers; a taboo can be revealed in advance to one
wizard and magically applied to a concrete case by another wizard.
When Weber classifies non-Roman law as "irrational" he is not
concerned with the "formal" irrationality of magic; he is concerned with
what he calls "substantive" irrationality. He says, "law making and
law finding are substantively irrational . . . to the extent that deci-
sion is influenced by concrete factors of the particular case as evaluated
upon an ethical, emotional or political basis rather than by general
norms." "8 In other words a judicial decision is "substantively" ir-
rational unless (1) it is, in fact, the result of disposing of the case by
applying a rule of law, rather than some other kind of guide to conduct
(such as a principle of morality, an intuited ethical truth, or a political
maxim), and unless (2) that rule of law actually has, in advance, solved
the kind of problem raised by the case at bar. Weber's definition of
"substantive rationality" requires further that the legal rule applied
have a special characteristic: the rule itself must be "rational"-that
is, it must be more than a mere legalistic, abstract rule; it must be based
on "ethical imperatives, expediential rules, and political maxims." 9
His system also includes a junior grade of legal rationality, which he
calls "formal rationality." It is like "substantive rationality" except
that the rules themselves need not be rational; they are what the layman
calls "technicalities" when he wants to infer that law has retreated to a
professional realm beyond ordinary men's understanding. Weber says
that a formally rational system is at least "relatively rational." He
divides formal rationality into two classes: (1) Rules of law requiring a
set form of words or acts to accomplish a certain kind of legal result
(some examples: words of negotiability in a promissory note, seals at
common law, delivery of a twig or clod to convey land by livery of
seisin). (2) "The other type of formalistic law is found where the
legally relevant characteristics of the facts are disclosed through the
logical analysis of meaning and where, accordingly, definite fixed
legal concepts in the form of highly abstract rules are formulated and
applied." 2"
16. LAw iN Soczry 59. Compare "Written law is the law for civilized nations:
traditionary law, for barbarians: customary law, for brutes." BENTHAm, TEm Lmirrs
oF JURiSPRuDENCE Dma..i 244 (Everett ed. 1945).
17. LAw IN Soc=r 63. (Emphasis added.)
18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 63-64.
20. Id. at 63.
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The first type of formalism can, of course, become archaic, over-
technical, and annoying. The common law seal's rigidity and livery
of seisin's naive drama fortunately are history and not practice. But
the formal words of negotiability, the arbitrary octagonal shape of high-
way stop signs, and the fixed requirements of statutes of frauds and
statutes of limitation have not become quaint nuisances; they are still
very useful.
Problems raised by Weber's second type of formality are much
more difficult and have been of central interest to twentieth century
legal philosophers-nearly all of whom deal with law's tendency to re-
treat into technical manipulation of words and away from concern
with policy.
THE PLACE OF WEBER'S THEORIES IN MODERN JURISTIC THOUGHT
Cardozo's The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) is con-
temporary with Weber's work. Cardozo pictured judges using a blend
of methods. The method he dealt with first-the "rule of analogy or
method of philosophy"-is virtually Weber's "formal rationality."
Cardozo describes this method as logical and abstract legal reasoning;
he gives it an important place in the judicial process.2
Like Weber, Cardozo says that other forces affect judges' decisions
and that they use other methods. He recognizes history's and tradi-
tion's part in the judicial process but his most stressed supplement to
abstract reasoning is "the method of sociology"-which focuses the
judicial process on society's welfare as the key to interpretation of
existing rules. Social welfare, says Cardozo, is a broad term; it may
mean expediency or prudence for the good of the collective body; or
it may mean social gain wrought by adherence to the community's
mores-the demands of religion, ethics, or the social sense of justice.22
Cardozo says judges do and should use both methods-that of "philos-
ophy" and that of "sociology."
Weber, as a "scientist," makes no judgment on what law's method
should be. He says, however, that the professional, legalistic and
abstract approach to law cannot exist and continue without some
acceptance of formally rational law.
"Only that abstract method which employs the logical inter-
pretation of meaning allows the execution of the specifically system-
atic task, i.e., the collection and rationalization by logical means
of all the several rules recognized as legally valid into an internally
consistent complex of abstract legal principles." '
21. CARIozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocEss 31-43 (1921).
22. Id. at 66-72.
23. LAw IN SocErY 64.
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Cardozo makes a value judgment. He gives his method of philos-
ophy an important permanent place in the judicial process, but he
approves it because of its secondary value in promoting orderliness and
impartiality.24 He says, "I am not to mar the symmetry of the legal
structure by the introduction of inconsistencies and irrelevancies and
artificial exceptions unless for some sufficient reason, which will com-
monly be some consideration of history, or custom, or policy, or
justice." 2 Even though Cardozo is a professional lawyer he publicly
devalues "formal rationality" whenever its abstractions hide and thwart
society's needs. Nevertheless he does agree with Weber that this in
fact happens.
Cardozo is one of those legal philosophers who characterize
modern law (including non-statutory law) as an application of prin-
ciples to facts-all of his "methods" of common-law decision are
different ways of understanding and developing existing common-law
rules and then applying them to cases.26 Weber, looking at a wider
strip of the legal fabric, sees courts sometimes deciding cases incon-
sistently on fluid and shifting grounds. He says, for example, that
English trial by jury replaced oracular ordeals but still resembled them
in one way-neither stated rational grounds for their holdings. Weber
continues,
"The popular view which assumes that questions of fact are
decided by the jury and questions of law by the judge is clearly
wrong. Lawyers esteem the jury system, and particularly the
civil jury, precisely because it decides certain concrete issues of
'law' without creating 'precedents' which might be binding in the
future, in other words because of the very 'irrationality' in which
a jury decides questions of law." 27
Remember that since Weber's "science" is "value free" he does not
condemn irrationality; he is describing and not deprecating practices
he calls irrational."8 Flexibility resulting from submitting to juries a
certain range of questions anew every time they occur is thought by
some (less value free) writers more desirable than formal fixed stand-
24. Weber, in passing, notes that one of judges' motives for respecting rules of
law used in the past is escape from charges of bias. Id. at 74.
25. CARDOZO, op. cit. supra note 21, at 33. (Emphasis added.)
26. But see id. at 19-20. "Some judges' . . . notion of their duty is to match
the case at hand against the colors of many sample cases spread out upon their desk.
The sample nearest in shade supplies the applicable rule."
27. LAw n Socnrv 79.
28. Especially is this so when Weber makes such statements as, for example,
"Because of the jury, some primitive irrationality . . . has thus continued to survive
in English procedure even up to present time." Id. at 80.
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ards (which can become outmoded and unjust and yet stay frozen into
law) .29
Weber characterizes common-law growth resulting from alternat-
ing interaction between private business practices and judicial decisions
as lacking in "the rational character of legal propositions as evolved by
modern legal science." He says that in this process cases are "distin-
guished from each other in a thoroughly empirical way in accordance
with their objective characteristics rather than in accordance with
their meanings as disclosed by formal legal logic." I He is talking
about judicial rule development aimed at substantive justice-the very
process that Cardozo calls "the method of sociology."
Americans have looked on Cardozo as a significant and enlightened
legal philosopher largely because his "method of sociology" legitimates
the adaptive justice of the common law. Though we can say that
Weber has not (even by implication) criticized either Cardozo's
theories or our liking for them, a reading of Weber does, nonetheless,
raise the question, are Cardozo's prized views an apology for less
rationality than we deserve? Before we deal directly with the question,
a more detailed look at what Weber has to say about social forces that
work for and against rationality in law is in order.
SOCIAL FORCES SUPPORTING OR ATTACKING LEGAL FORMALISM
The politically powerful of ancient times, says Weber, did not out-
mode magic to serve only their own interests. They were pushed in
that direction "by powerful interest groups with whom they were
allied and to whom rationality in substantive law and procedure con-
stituted an advantage, as, for instance, to the bourgeois classes of
Rome, of the late Middle Ages, or of modern times." Weber continues,
saying that juridical thought was retarded when those in power were
not allied with commercial interests, because priests and monarchs are
not impelled to stabilize legal systems; their own temperaments and
aims are usually better served by non-formal law.3 Non-formal law
also suits the politically powerful in democracies; they seldom are will-
ing to tie themselves down by rules 2-even those they enact. Demo-
crats inevitably are put to the choice between: (a) formalism's certainty
29. See Bohlen, Mixed QOestions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 111 (1924).
Compare note 63 infra setting out opposite views of Traynor.
30. LAW IN SocIEy 80.
31. Id. at 225.
32. Weber probably does not include constitutions; he excepts "those norms
which they regard as religiously sacred and hence absolutely binding." Id. at 226.
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and impartiality, and (b) their prized substantive goals. 3 When
economic power is spread unequally formal systems of justice tend to
stabilize a system in conflict with religious ethics or with political
expediency.
"Formal justice is . . . repugnant to all authoritarian
powers . . . because it diminishes the dependence of the in-
dividual upon the grace and power of the authorities. To democ-
racy, however, it has been repugnant because it decreases the
dependency of the . . . individuals upon the decisions of their
fellow citizens." 34
Authoritarians and democrats are likely to prefer what Weber calls
"Khadi justice"--"decisions reached on the basis of concrete, ethical,
or political considerations or of feelings oriented toward social jus-
tice" '--decisions made not on the basis of legal rules inspired by these
materials, but on the materials themselves.
Laymen (who read into formal rules economic and utilitarian
meanings), says Weber, are doomed to legal disappointment; formal
legal thought is bound to diverge from private economic expectations.
"Lawyers' law" will protect laymen's expectations only when lawyers
renounce the formalism embedded in their law-an unlikely event.
Lawyers' formalism, says Weber, will persist in England as doggedly
as on the continent.36
Lawyers' mechanically simple roles in formal systems, however,
irk some of them. Weber says that these lawyers try to up-grade their
work by demanding a creative judicial process-at least when statutory
law is "silent." The "free law" school holds this view in an extreme
form: statutes inevitably, they say, are silent because life's facts are
legally unorderly; judicial decisions, therefore, should be made as
"concrete evaluations" rather than in accord with formal legal rules.3 '
Jurists who believe that gaps are bound to occur in all systems of legal
rules say that the judicial process
"never consisted, or at any rate never should consist, in the 'appli-
cation' of general norms to a concrete case . . . . In this view,
the 'legal propositions' are regarded as secondary.3  [T]he
preference for a case law which remains in contact with legal
reality-which means with the reality of the lawyers-to statute
33. Id. at 226-27.
34. Id. at 228.
35. Id. at 228-29.
36. Id. at 307-08.
37. Id. at 307-09.
38. Id. at 311.
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law is in turn subverted by the argument that no precedent should
be regarded as binding beyond its concrete facts. The way is thus
left open to the free balancing of values in each individual case." "
However most lawyers, says Weber, recoil from creative roles
that leave their law so unchanneled, and try "to re-establish an objective
standard of values." 4o Judges, presently and in the past, tend to think
of themselves as "the mouthpieces of norms already existing, though
perhaps only latently, and to be their interpreters or appliers rather
than their creators." "' Weber prophesies that growth of legislation's
scope will change the English judge's role profoundly, and he says that
laying a "creator's crown" on the brow of the continental judge would
not much dispose him to strike out on his own. "In any case the
juristic precision of judicial opinions will be seriously impaired if
sociological, economic, or ethical argument were to take the place of
legal concepts." ' In spite of various economic and political forces
disfavoring formalism, laymen's ignorance of the law will increase;
legal specialization will keep pace with inexorable technological and
economic growth; the specialists are sure to develop more complicated
legal rationality. Weber does not insist that this more specialized law
will be inflexible. "Inevitably," he says, "the notion must expand that
the law is a rational technical apparatus, which is continually trans-
formable in the light of expediential considerations and devoid of all
sacredness of content." 4 Weber is not, however, here prophesying
extended use of Cardozo's method of sociology, since Weber is fore-
seeing a system that is rational and yet socially adaptable, and since his
"rationality" implies separation of law making and adjudication, Weber
must mean that enlightened and mobile legislation (or administrative
rule making) will advance law's ability to serve society's needs.
In his last paragraphs Weber says that all democratic movements
are ambivalent toward legal rationality. Demands for "legal equality"
39. Id. at 313.
40. Ibid.
41. Id. at 320. Remember Cardozo looks on the judge as a molder of existing
rules.
42. Id. at 320.
43. Id. at 321. Weber also considers the rationality of the executive branch of
government Technical superiority, he says, accounts for the success of bureaucracy.
Id. at 349. Bureaucracy allocates administration to appropriate specialists, and their
professional performance results in execution of their work without regard for persons
and in accordance with calculable rules. Ibid. "In the place of the old type ruler
who is moved by sympathy, favor, grace, and gratitude, modern culture requires
the emotionally detached, and hence rigorously 'professional' expert." Id. at
35i. But, says Weber, objectivity and professionalism need not be identical with
supremacy of general abstract rules. The bureaucrat is sometimes instructed by statute
to individualize. Executives who claim freedom within their jurisdiction can act
without being personally motivated. In principle, says Weber, behind every act of
administration there can be a system of rationally discussable grounds. Id. at 354-55..
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and guarantees against official caprice call for formal rationality."
Demands for justice to individuals in concrete cases embarrass
formalism and the rule-bound objectivity of bureaucracy.4
WHEN LEGAL FORMALISM WILL OR SHOULD TRIUMPH
Weber's classification of law as rational only when made by one
arm of the government and applied by another and as irrational when
judges deciding concrete cases are also lawmakers can be defended as
a scholar's "value free" analysis that he finds useful. But I propose to
show in the following paragraphs that his system of definitions may,
in one respect, under-stress important facts.
Perhaps Immanuel Kant was the most uncompromising exponent
of man's capacity to lead a rational life. Kant said man can exert free
will only if he is rational; by cold abstract reason man can escape from
both enslavement to his emotions and involvement in unimportant pass-
ing circumstances; by conforming to the universally right, man can
both avoid logical contradiction and harmonize his own free will with
free wills of others.46
Kant's arid and psychologically impossible prescriptions have little
appeal in our time. But he left us some valuable ethical legacies--one
of which is his Categorical Imperative: Act according to a maxim that
can be adopted as a universal law. 47 The Categorical Imperative calls
not only for the substance of unselfishness urged by the Golden Rule;
it also insists on a procedure of rationality. One who stops for a
minute before acting (to imagine how he would like to be done by)
may not stop long enough to formulate a maxim for his conduct worthy
of being a universal rule. The Categorical Imperative, then, prescribes
not warm considerateness but profound consideration.
Kant allies himself with Thomas and Rousseau in recognizing the
rationalizing force resulting from dispassionate formulation of general
rules of law. But unlike them Kant does not insist that a judge must
apply only rules formulated prospectively. On the contrary the
Categorical Imperative demands wide ranging thoughtfulness on fields
of action as well as in dens of reflection.
44. He has said earlier that formal rationality is preferred by three kinds of
people: (1) Those in economic power who want to guard the status quo and promote
stability. (2) Those who want to curb authoritarians. (3) Those who want to check
irrational emotions of the masses. Id. at 228-29.
45. Id. at 355-56.
46. This seems to me to be most available in the first forty-nine pages of THE
SciENcE oF RIGHT (1791) translated by Hastie and published under the title of Kant's
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW.
47. Id. at 34.
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Perhaps, then, we can say that Cardozo's "method of sociology"
calls for rationality in a Kantian sense; it is reasoned, objective, and
principled, even though the judge using it may creatively make (or,
more properly, remake) law for the type of case before him. This does
not mean, of course, that a judicial lawmaker spontaneously emits newly
formed rules molded without reference to the concrete case he is hearing.
All rule making is a process (moving from an inchoate start to an
organized product) whether the job is done by a legislator or a judge.
Weber believes that any judge who adapts old law to new needs
acts like a Khadi. He takes his cues from hunches, predilections, ideals
and community values-instead of from rules of law. He does not
rationalize his holdings by subsuming cases under established rules.
This picture is a good likeness of some common law judges some of
the time.
A judge settling a substantive law issue can write an opinion bare
of rules and relying only on precedents. Says Cardozo, "Some judges'
. . . notion of their duty is to match the case at hand against the
colors of many sample cases spread out upon their desk. The sample
nearest in shade supplies the applicable rule." Cardozo, like Weber,
sees the irrationality in such a cramped technique. Cardozo con-
tinues, "But, of course, no system of living law can be evolved by
such a process, and no judge of a high court worthy of his office,
views the function of his place so narrowly." " A wider technique
moves out from cases to principles, from the Khadi justice of in-
formed intuition to more articulate reasoning in which rules of law
(perhaps newly reshaped) are applicable and applied to the facts
of the case. Such a process can be usefully thought of as rational-as
importantly different from intuited Khadi decisions and importantly
like reasoned decisions reached by applying rules laid down in advance
of litigation. Thoughtful and objective judicial lawmaking can be as
thoughtful and objective as judicial application of statutes.
The point of Cardozo's theory of multiple methods is that frozen
law will not stay reasoned and reasonable; therefore unless courts re-
adapt the law from time to time it becomes irrational- legalistic appli-
cation of abstract doctrine, in the long run, becomes blind technique.
Aristotle saw the clumsiness inevitable in pre-stated legal rules.
"[T] he material of conduct", he says, "is essentially irregular. When
therefore the law lays down a general rule, and thereafter a case arises
which [should be] an exception to the rule, it is then right . . . to
rectify the defect by deciding as the law giver would himself decide if
4&. CAiwozo, op. cit. supra note 21, at 19-20.
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he were present on the occasion, and would have enacted if he had been
cognizant of the case in question." " A judge who can reduce the
ambit of his thinking to Weber's formal rationality will thereafter never
see any reason to except a case from a rule abstractly covering that case.
Writing a quarter century earlier than Cardozo and Weber,
Holmes (after depreciating "the black letter" man who unknowingly
uses rules laid down on grounds long outmoded) said, "A body of law
is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains is re-
ferred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and
when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or are ready to be
stated in words." " Only the judge who knows the purpose to be ad-
vanced by a rule can know the kinds of cases to which it applies.
Holmes gives several illustrations of bungling resulting from formal
legal reasoning.
We have learned to suspect that judges sometimes defend their
decisions with technical rationalizations having nothing to do with the
policy grounds which really motivated them. Policy then operates
behind a facade of formal reasoning-a facade complying with the
decorative decencies and avoiding embarrassing exposure of social
preferences.'- So the pattern of formal rationality can be followed by
judges actuated by considerations of Khadi justice or inarticulately
using "the method of sociology." Unfortunately, then, either Khadi
justice may go unnoticed and unevaluated or errors and ten-strikes of
the "method of sociology" may lie buried.
We must not overbelieve that systematized social wisdom lies
behind all judicial formalism. Judges are often preoccupied with legal
doctrine as the result of: (a) their training and habits, (b) force of
legal conceptions, (c) the clarity of some legislation, (d) lack of
competent advocacy on policy issues, (e) the feeling that policy con-
siderations are irrelevant, and so on. Trial judges with crowded
dockets can be sometimes harried into legalistic thought at the expense
of substantive justice. Many trial judges over-dread appellate court
reversals; some of them, rightly or wrongly, think that their appellate
courts hold to formal considerations-especially when that court has
clearly enunciated an applicable doctrine. This attitude of trial judges
is partly an attitude on separation of functions-an allocation of roles;
49. V NICo MACHEA1 ETHICS ch. x, at 315, 317 (Rackham transl. 1947).
50. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAxv. L. REv. 457 (1897), in CoLr CT
LEGAI PAPERS 167, 186-87 (1921).
51. Some of these embarrassments would, of course, grow out of disagreement
on proper policy. Thurman Arnold, in his SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935) and
his FoLxI.0R OF CAPITALISM (1937), has taught us that legal formalities serve a
psychological need in bolstering public faith in the stability, certainty, and rightness
of government and law.
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trial judges are likely to think that correction or qualification of supreme
court pronouncements is properly done only by supreme court judges
and that their own role requires them to apply the law laid down by
the supreme court.5
Weber, you will remember, says that certain classes of people are
naturally partisans of legal formalism: the economically favored believe
formalism preserves the status quo. Patriots believe that formalism
curbs both authoritarians and mass hysteria,' that formalism defines
freedom and checks official caprice. 4 These views are not so convincing
after fascist and communist governments have downed both the eco-
nomically favored and the democratically dedicated while making few
changes in existing legal systems, and, perhaps, increasing the formalism
of some branches of law.55 Legal abstraction usually is a preferred
method of courts and often promotes stability, but it enthralls beyond
escape only pedants, routineers, and admirers of elegantia juris; it does
not stop (though it may impede) economic and political change-just
or unjust.
The common-law system cannot be described properly without
recognizing that it furnishes judges (as guides to decision) a pre-
formulated, authoritative body of doctrine (rules, principles, maxims-
more or less integrated and consistent). Though judges purport to
have high respect for this doctrine as a body, stability of the common
law nevertheless varies. The occasions for variance can be classified.
The four following factors should be distinguished:
(1) Sometimes, as we remarked earlier, formality has special
merit and legal inventions may advance justice by insisting on techni-
calities. For example, courts have stood by rules of law (variously
stated) effectuating attempts to change life insurance beneficiaries only
when policy owners do all within their power to comply with the
formalities required by policy stipulations."0 This formalism tends to
discourage litigation that might otherwise dissipate the competence of
the widows and children who are the bulk of life insurance beneficiaries.
The special social value of such formalism tends to keep it intact.
Note, however, that the formal rule will also be applied to cases in
52. A corollary to this guess is that trial judges are more likely to be swayed
by considerations of policy in cases that probably will not be appealed.
53. LAW IN SocIETY 228-29.
54. Id. at 355-56.
55. See Lon Fuller's essay in MY PHroSOPIsY OF LAW 111 (1941), in which he
portrays formalism as the tool of excess and praises the ability of more intuitive, less
overly rational systems to produce moderate, temperate government and law. Com-
pare his more recent Positivimn and Fidelity to Law, 71 HARV. L. REv. 630 (1958).
56. See PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LA-W 214-20 (2d ed. 1958).
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which it has no such value: a change of insurance beneficiary dispute
between a millionaire's third mistress and his fourth cousin is decided
by the same formal rules that determine a dispute between a workman's
widow and his mother. So once formality has substantive value it
tends to spread to cases in which that value is not realized; this spread
is checked only when the rule reaches ground where it will produce
disquieting results. The reason for accepting the rule in cases in which
it is not needed but does no harm is clear enough; judges will not
break the shell of formality for fear that the whole egg may spill out.
(2) Formalism tending to produce substantive injustice sometimes
stays fairly steady on the verbal surface of the law but covers in fact a
variety of more just results. Another chapter from insurance law will
illustrate. Eighteenth century judges held in marine insurance cases
that any breach of warranty (no matter how slight and even though
it did not contribute to the loss) relieves the underwriter from liability.
This rule worked well enough; buyers of marine insurance were familiar
with the law; policies were hand written and short; warranties were
exacted only after discussion and understanding. When, however,
American companies sold fine-print fire, automobile, and life insurance
to the untutored public, courts soon adapted Draconian warranty law to
the changed facts. Of course, the courts enforced some just warranties
in these policies, but they found ways to circumvent clauses that unjustly
limited company liability. They held that some clauses designed to
restrict protection were "mere description" and not warranties, that
some failures to comply with warranties were not breaches, that com-
panies had waived some breaches, and that companies were estopped
from asserting some breaches. 7 The formal rules of insurance war-
ranties changed a little in the process-but remarkably little. The real
changes in holdings were radical. Since the formal law tended to stay
intact novices find insurance warranty law confusing; courts have been
properly selective in choosing the warranties they disfavor; they uphold
just warranties with ancient hard-boiled rules, which they easily push
aside when they want soft-boiled results.& 8 The pressure of substantive
justice does not always, however, rectify unjust formal rationality.
The courts that readapted insurance warranty law kept intact scandal-
57. See Morris, Waiver and Estoppel in Insurance Contracts, 105 U. PA.. L. REV.
925 (1957).
58. Cardozo was a past master at leaving formal rules almost as he found them
vhile making radical changes in the law. His opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 11 N.E. 1050 (1916), broke down barriers that protected nearly
all negligent manufacturers from liability to consumers. His decision rested on the
simple holding that "inherently dangerous" commodities included, in fact, more prod-
ucts than were theretofore so characterized.
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ously unjust industrial accident law. Legislatures in all forty-eight
states had to reform the law and provide proper remedies for workmen
injured on the job. We do not know whether courts would have
eventually readapted this branch of law had the legislatures not stepped
in, but we do know that courts showed no disposition to do so for a
long time.59
(3) We have seen that common-law courts tend to stand by
formalism when it is just and sometimes readapt the law when formalism
is unjust. But there is an in-between class: formality may be neither
just nor unjust. A few examples: (a) The distinction between a
contract and a trust is neither just nor unjust. If an owner of a
diamond ring wants to bind himself to give it to his nephew on a future
date he can do so by declaring a trust. If he tries to accomplish the
same result by contracting "without consideration," his promise to
make the future gift-no matter how formal-is, according to common-
law rules, not binding. Since there is a legally proper way to do the
job, courts presided over by trained judges tend to require that it be
done that way. When no special equity dislodges this tendency, the
legalistically correct theory determines results. (b) The putative father
of an illegitimate child refuses to support it and a bastardy suit is filed
against him. He marries the girl, legitimating the child, but still
declares he shall never contribute to its maintenance. The bastardy
proceeding has become legally inappropriate; his duty to support the
child must now be enforced in some other kind of proceeding." (c) In
some borderline "proximate cause" cases the courts may have no
decisive policy reason for holding that the wrongdoer is or is not
responsible for some unusual result-that is, considerations of justice
do not dictate exact limits of liability and from the viewpoint of justice
the case is unresolvable. Once, however, the case is decided (one way
or the other) it becomes a reliable precedent and if virtually the same
facts recur the court is likely to follow it."'
(4) Jerome Frank wrote tellingly about the need for "fact
skepticism." He pictured our courts as rarely reaching sound con-
clusions of fact in many kinds of litigation.62  When courts are likely
59. See, e.g., the court's liberal treatment of the claimant in a modern Oregon
work injury case that happened to fall outside of the workman's compensation law.
Celorie v. Roberts Bros., 202 Ore. 671, 276 P.2d 416 (1954). How would this case
have been decided if the court had not had the example of a quarter century of work-
man's compensation? Cf. Mahoney v. Dore, 155 Mass. 513, 30 N.E. 366 (1892).
60. Overseer of the Poor, Kenilworth v. Koznowicz, 50 N.J. Super. 218, 141
A.2d 567 (L 1958).
61. See Momis, ToaTs 192-94 (1953).
62. See particularly his CouRTs oN TRIAL (1949).
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to reach unpredictable versions of fact, adherence to formal legal prin-
ciples will not serve those who look to law for stability, regularity and
predictability.'
"Formal rationality," then, holds the law-in-action stable when
facts are not likely to be misfound, and when formality produces results
not inconsistent with substantive justice. Substantively unjust results
may become institutionalized and persist, but the courts tend eventually
to become uneasy with them and in the long run some use of Cardozo's
"method of sociology" is likely.
The last conclusion suggests a new line of questions. Why do
courts in fact react promptly against some miscarriages of substantive
justice and yet tolerate others for years? When, if ever, should courts
be reluctant to use the method of sociology? How should the respon-
sibility for readaptation of the law be divided between courts and
legislatures? Judges readapted the law of insurance warranties, but
did nothing to ameliorate unjust industrial accident law. Why?
Perhaps forces that have vitalized and repressed judicial law re-
form are fortuitous. Early in the twentieth century insurance claimants
may have been able to hire better lawyers than injured workmen.
Judges as a class may have been well disposed toward insurance claim-
ants. Some judges not only recoiled from reforming industrial accident
law themselves, they were also hostile to legislative reform.
On the other hand judges' motives for adapting one branch of the
law and leaving reform of another branch to the legislature may have
been related to the competence and facilities of the two different
departments of government. Some judges may have believed that
change in industrial accident law could be rational only if enacted by
the legislature. Legislative committees can investigate needs and ways
and means by making inquiries and holding hearings. The legislature
can set up new administrative machinery when needed. The legislature
can give advance warning of impending change so that those affected
can get ready for it. The case for reform was of a kind legislators are
likely to heed. The courts may have, however, despaired of the likeli-
hood that busy legislators would get to the lesser problem of insurance
warranties-especially since claimants who need law reform know of
their need only after their claims arise and so are too late to appeal to
the legislature. Maybe judges believed that the insurance law reform
could best be made case-by-case and on the social information already
63. Traynor in his Fact Skepticism and the Judicial Process, 106 U. PA. L. Rxv.
635 (1958), concedes that improvement of fact finding procedures should go hand-in-
hand with improvement of legal principles-else courts will be driven more inexorably
to unjust results. In Weber's terms, he prefers Khadi justice to efficient, formal,
rationally-arrived-at injustice.
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at hand. Perhaps they were unworried about the retroactive effect of
their reform, believing it would have infinitesimal effect on "the ex-
perience" of any one insurance company.
I do not claim accuracy for these guesses about judges' motivations
for adapting the law or leaving reform to the legislature. The fact of
significance is that judges rarely talk about this problem in their
opinions. Of course judges who turn down pleas for law reform often
say that law reform is the business of the legislature and not of courts
-thus they appear respectful to the constitution rather than deaf to
justice. But since common law courts using Cardozo's method of
sociology do, in fact, sometimes adapt the law, and since we look on
this process as sometimes legitimate, we must note the lack of articulate
criteria to tell when this process is proper. Without such criteria
decisions are Khadi justice-perhaps sometimes not entirely un-
channeled. Thus far, however, neither "formal" nor "substantive"
rationality, to use Weber's terms, has been brought to bear on decisions
defining the judge's role.
I do not mean that decisions made over the years were unsound.
Since we know little about that borderland of lawmaking lying between
legislative and judicial functions perhaps we have been wise in granting
intuition and experiment maximum range-guided only by a few
general statements like Holmes' dictum that molecular change is for
courts and molar change for legislatures." Only in our century has the
legislative process flowered. Judicial respect for its potentialities and
appreciation of its advantages have grown-and prompted the judiciary
to be more modest in its estimate of its own worth. Perhaps for the
first time jurists are competent to formulate guides for discriminating
sharply between areas of law reform appropriate to courts and areas
that should be left to the legislature. Such a body of doctrine would be
substantively rather than formally rational only if its formulators base
it: (1) on knowledge of the kinds of problems legislators and ad-
ministrators will and should tackle, and (2) on understanding of the
advantages and facilities of legislative and administrative lawmaking.
The problem may be too complicated and too fast moving for useful
rationalization. Perhaps wisdom may call for a continued Khadi
judgment that may become increasingly channeled. But most enthusi-
asts for legal intuition generally limit their enthusiasm to pre-rational
problems which, for the time being, do not yet yield to reason. If we
develop an articulate rational technique for discriminating between (a)
unjust rules and decisions that should be corrected only by legislation,
64. The phrase is quoted and discussed by John Dickinson in his essay in My
PHmosoPHY oF LAw 102-03 (1941).
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and (b) unjust rules and decisions that courts can properly ameliorate,
we may advance the common good."5
65. One articulated indication that courts may be moving in this direction is
the opinion of Desmond, J. in Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951),
a case overruling a precedent holding that a perpetrator of pre-natal injuries cannot
be held liable for harm he does. Desmond says, "Of course rules of law on which
men rely in their business dealings should not be changed in the middle of the game,
but what has that to do with bringing to justice a tort-feasor who surely has no
moral right to rely on a decision of the New York Court of Appeals? Negligence
law is common law, and common law has been molded and changed and brought up
to date in many another case . . . . Justice Sutherland, writing for the Supreme
Court in Funk v. United States (290 U.S. 371, 382, 54 S. Ct. 212, 215, 78 L. Ed. 369)
said that while legislative bodies have the power to change old rules of law, never-
theless, when they fail to act, it is the duty of the court to bring the law into accordance
with present day standards of wisdom and justice ....
"The same answer goes to the argument that the change we here propose should
come from the legislature, not the courts. Legislative action there could, of course,
be, but we abdicate our own function, in a field peculiarly non-statutory, when we
refuse to reconsider old and unsatisfactory court made rules. Perhaps some kinds of
changes in the common law could not be safely made without the kind of factual
investigation which the Legislature and not the courts, is equipped for. Other pro-
posed changes require elaborate research and consideration of a variety of possible
remedies-such questions are peculiarly appropriate for Law Revision Commission
scrutiny, and, in fact, the Law Revision Commission has made an elaborate examina-
tion of this very problem (1935 Report of N.Y. Law Revision Commission, pp. 449-
476). That study was made at the instance of the late Chief Judge Pound of this
Court and was transmitted to the Legislature by the commission . . . . The report
itself contained no recommendations for legislation on the subject but that was appar-
ently because the commission felt it was for the courts to deal with this common law
question . .. ."
1958]
